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Introduction 
Abstract
This paper uses CSP to introduce a characterisation of noninterference
in terms of the deductions that may be made about high level processes by
low level tests May testing yields classic noninference and has a concise
formulation in CSP It is preserved by a wider range of composition oper
ators than are normally considered in the context of noninterference It
turns out that the extensive list of compositionality theorems in our case
can be used to derive the cases generally considered The CSP character
isation of may noninterference also permits some attractive and simple
compositionality proofs
  Introduction
Compositionality of noninterference properties is essential for constructing secure
systems out of secure components This argument was made by McCullough 	
as motivation for his de
nition of restrictiveness a property which ensures non
interference and which is also preserved by system composition In the literature
there are a number of formulations of noninterference see for example   
 	 which tend to use state machines or event systems as their system models
and which de
ne notions of system composition with respect to the semantic
framework they have set up
Process algebra provides a mature theory for the modelling of systems built
out of a number of components and oers a number of compositional operators
for constructing systems It is naturally suited to the description of concurrent
systems and provides a framework for their analysis with respect to particular
requirements with established techniques for reasoning
This paper investigates the notion of noninterference from the point of view
of may testing a technique used in process algebra to characterise process equiv
alence One motivation for starting from may testing is that it provides a natural
and intuitive understanding of the property that we aim to investigate and of
the systems to which this investigation will apply
In the context of noninterference we might wish to claim that a system
provides noninterference between a high level interfaceH and a low level interface
L if no interactions at the low level can provide any information about any user
at the high level This is formalised as the requirement that no low level test on
the system can distinguish between any two high level users
This de
nition is intuitively appealing but is too cumbersome to work with
directly in the analysis of alleged noninterfering systems We are able to charac
terise this noninterference property in terms of conditions on the system without
explicit reference to high level users It turns out to correspond to the property
noninference considered by OHalloran 	 and more recently investigated by
Focardi and Gorrieri 	 though we have given a more direct motivation for it
and thus provide additional insight into their formulations
We investigate its composability through a wide range of CSP composition
operators including forms of parallel combination sequencing and hiding The
processalgebraic framework we use yields surprisingly simple proofs of composi
tionality generally four or 
ve lines of algebra The external combinators typi
cally used in studies of noninterferencecross product cascade and feedback
can be expressed in terms of the CSP compositions and so results about these
external combinators are easily derived
 Notation
Process algebras provide a particular approach to the study of concurrency and
interaction This paper bases its discussion within the framework of the pro
cess algebra CSP Communicating Sequential Processes A full account of this
process algebra can be found in  	 It provides a language for describing in
teracting systems together with a semantic theory for understanding them This
section provides a brief reminder of those aspects most relevant to this paper
The language of CSP is constructed around events instantaneous synchro
nisations which provide the communication primitive Events may have some
structure the most common communication being a channel communication of
the form c v  where c is the channel name and v is the value communicated For
the purposes of this paper we will divide  the set of all events into two classes
H high and L low The set H will be further divided into high inputs HI and
high outputs HO 
Processes are used to describe possible patterns of interaction In CSP a
process P has an alphabet or interface P the set of events it is able to
synchronise on The process cv   P describes a process which is prepared to
output v on channel c and behave subsequently as P  The input cx   Px 
may take in some value v along channel c and behave subsequently as Pv The
choice P u Q may behave nondeterministically either as P or as Q  and the
choice P   Q oers a choice between P and Q to its environment Processes
may be put in parallel P
k
A
Q behaves as P running concurrently with Q 
synchronising on events in A and performing other events independently Often
A will be the intersection of the alphabets of P and Q  Values are passed between
parallel processes by means of synchronisations on the channels linking an output
channel of one to an input channel of another An interleaving of two processes
P jjj Q  simply executes P and Q concurrently without any communication
occurring between them The abstraction mechanismP n A describes the process
P with all occurrences of A occurring internally in the resulting process The
process Stop can perform no events at all Thus P
k
A
Stop behaves as the process
P with all occurrences of A blocked This is dierent from P n A in which all
occurrences of events in A are made internal The process Run
A
also has alphabet
Notation 
A and it is always ready to perform any event from the set A Processes may
also be recursively de
ned by giving equations which contain the name of the
process being de
ned as a subterm of the process expression For example the
process
Copy  inx   out x   Copy
de
nes a buer process Copy as one which repeatedly alternates input and output
Indexed processes may also be recursively de
ned using families of equations
The semantics of processes are given in terms of observations A process is
identi
ed with the set of behaviours that may possibly be observed of it where
the kind of behaviour considered determines the nature of the model
The Traces Model is concerned with the traces of a process the 
nite se
quences of events that it can perform during some execution The notation hi
denotes the empty trace and tr
 
a
tr

denotes concatenation of tr
 
and tr

 Given
a CSP process P  its set of traces is given by tracesP For example
tracesCopy 
fhig
 fhin vi j v  V g
 fhin v  out  vi j v  V g
 fhin v  out  v  in wi j v  V w  V g



where V is the type of the channels in out 
If tr is a possible trace of a process P  then Ptr pronounced P after tr 
denotes the process that P becomes after executing the trace tr  For example
Copyhin i  out   Copy
The traces model is sucient for the purposes of this paper More sophis
ticated models which extend the traces model are used to handle phenomena
such as deadlock divergence and nondeterminism
Processes are considered equivalent in a semantic model if they have the same
set of behaviours in that model Thus if P and Q have the same traces then
they are equivalent in the traces model written P 
traces
Q  This means that if
only their traces are examined then they cannot be distinguished A process P
is re
ned by a process Q in the traces model if all the traces of Q are also traces
of P  This is written P v
traces
Q  All of the CSP operators are monotonic with
respect to re
nement re
nement of components in a CSP combination will result
in a re
nement of the combination In this paper we are concerned only with the
traces model and so we will drop the subscript from the equality symbol and the
re
nement symbol The traces model supports a number of algebraic equations
and re
nement relationships Those used in algebraic manipulations within the
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Figure  Some algebraic laws of the CSP traces model
the proofs later in this paper are given in Figure  They are not referred to
explicitly within proofs in order to avoid cluttering them
One approach to comparing processes is in terms of testing A test T is a
particular kind of process with some Success states We consider the execution of
T in conjunction over the set  of all events with a process P  and if P
k

T  n 
can reach a success state then we say that P may T  If P may T whenever
Q may T and vice versa for all possible tests T  then P and Q are equivalent
under may testing It turns out that this will be the case precisely when P and
Q have the same traces For further information on testing see for instance 	
Finally for the purposes of this paper it will be useful to characterise in the
traces model what is meant by a process always being willing to accept any event
from a set A
Denition  A process P is open on A if
 tr  tracesP a  A  tr
a
hai  tracesP
Noninterference and may testing 
U
H
P
L
T
Figure  Testing U through P
 
 Noninterference and may testing
We are concerned with a system P whose interface alphabet is partitioned into
a set of high level events H and a set of low level events L The intention is that
observing or interacting with the system only at the low level should not provide
information about what is going on at the high level
In this paper noninterference will be considered from the point of view of
whether a low level agent interacting with P may distinguish between two arbi
trary processes U
 
and U

which are interacting with P at the high level The
high level user might or might not be able to observe low level activity directly
and we will consider both of these possibilities In fact they turn out to be
equivalent for may testing
The 
rst de
nition considers the high level agents to be concerned only with
high level events This is pictured in Figure  In this paper all pictures in the

gures of systems P with partitioned interfaces will have high level events to the
left and low level events to the right of the process as for P in this 
gure
Denition  P is may noninterfering abbreviated mayNI if for any test
T  and any two high level users U
 
and U


U
 
k
H
P n H may T 	 U

k
H
P n H may T
 
An alternative de
nition is concerned with the situation in which high level
agents are able to observe low level events as long as they cannot prevent low
level events from occurring This condition is necessary since otherwise high
level agents could be distinguished by a low level test through no fault of P  For
example the test l   Success could tell the dierence between two high level
U
H
P
L
T
Figure  Strong testing U through P  U can observe low level events
processes U
 
 l   Stop and U

 Stop through system P  l   Stop since U

blocks l 
Denition  P is strong may noninterfering if for any test T  and any two
high level users U
 
and U

which are open on L
U
 
k
H L
P n H may T 	 U

k
H L
P n H may T
 
In fact as we shall see the two de
nitions on a system P are equivalent for may
testing although they correspond to dierent situations
May testing corresponds to simply watching low level events as they occur
and signalling success if particular sequences are observed
These de
nitions state that P will prevent interference if no low level activity
can ever distinguish between two dierent high level processes if some low level
activity is possible for one then it is also possible for the other
A key point is that high level users should be indistinguishable rather than
high level activity This means that some possible high level traces can still be
ruled out on observing low level behaviour even if high level processes cannot be
distinguished
Example  The process
P
 
 l   Stop   h   Stop
is mayNI Any low level view is going to see either an l or just the empty trace
and the possibility of the l cannot be prevented by any high level process Thus
no low level test will distinguish any two high level processes On the other hand
observation of l informs us that h cannot have occurred in that same execution
so it does convey some information about the particular high level activity ie
that h has not occurred Conversely observation of the empty trace does not
convey any information about the high level activity  
Noninterference and may testing 	
Example  The process
P

 h   l   Stop
is not mayNI In this case there are two users h   Stop and Stop which can
be distinguished by the test l   Success  If h is required for l to be possible
then observation of l allows the deduction that h must have occurred and hence
that the high level user was able to perform h  
Thus if high level activity is required for particular low level activity then
this de
nition states that there is interference But if high level activity leads
only to absence of or reduced low level activity or equivalently that absence of
high level activity is required for low level activity then this de
nition allows
that there is no interference Any high level user is able to engage in absence of
high level activity
Thus identifying a capacity for not performing high level events does not
distinguish high level processes since all high level users have that capacity
  Characterisation in the traces model
It turns out that mayNI coincides with the property of noninference proposed
by OHalloran 	 that if tr  tracesP then tr n H  tracesP This may
also be expressed as Stop
k
H
P  P n H 
Theorem  P is mayNI if and only if P n H  P
k
H
Stop in the traces model
 
Proof It is a standard result that T  P may T 	 Q may T exactly
characterises traces equivalence tracesP  tracesQ
If P is mayNI then given any two users U
 
and U


U
 
k
H
P n H may T 	 U

k
H
P n H may T
for any test T  and so U
 
k
H
P n H  U

k
H
P n H  This is therefore true for
the two particular high level users Stop and Run
H
 and so
Stop
k
H
P n H  Run
H
k
H
P n H
which simpli
es to
P
k
H
Stop  P n H

Conversely observe that any high level user U has that
Run
H
v U v Stop
Now suppose that Stop
k
H
P  P n H  It follows by monotonicity of the CSP
operators that
Run
H
k
H
P n H v U
k
H
P n H v Stop
k
H
P n H
and hence that
P n H v U
k
H
P n H v Stop
k
H
P
Since P n H  P
k
H
Stop it follows that all three processes are equal Thus all
high level users in parallel with P present the same low level view and so
U
 
k
H
P n H  U

k
H
P n H
and so they may pass the same tests T  Thus P is mayNI  
Corollary 	 P is mayNI if and only if
U
 
k
H
P n H  U

k
H
P n H
for any two high level processes U
 
and U

  
The same characterisation also holds for strong may noninterference
Theorem 
 P is strongly may noninterfering if and only if
P n H  P
k
H
Stop
 
Proof The proof is similar to that for may noninterference Firstly if P is
strongly may noninterfering then the high level users open on L Run
H L
and
Run
L
cannot be distinguished so P n H and P
k
H
Stop must have the same
traces
Conversely for any process U open on L and with alphabet H  L we have
that
Run
H L
v U v Run
L
Noninterference and may testing 
Now suppose that P n H and P
k
H
Stop have the same traces Then by mono
tonicity
Run
H L
k
H L
P n H v U
k
H L
P n H
v Run
L
k
H L
P n H
ie
P n H v U
k
H L
P n H v P
k
H
Stop
and thus
P n H  U
k
H L
P n H  P
k
H
Stop
Since this is true for any U open on L it follows that no low level test can
distinguish any two high level processes  
Corollary  Strong may noninterference and may noninterference are equiv
alent  
As a result of this corollary we need only investigate one of these forms of non
interference for the rest of this paper we will use may noninterference
 Signals and high level outputs
The above characterisation of may noninterference assumes a framework in which
all high level events are synchronisations between the system and the high level
user and thus that the high level user has a veto over all such events Low level
evidence that such events have occurred thus indeed provides information about
the activity of the high level user
However there are situations where high level events are required to pass
information from the system to the high level process but where the high level
process cannot prevent such events from occurring Examples include high level
signals such as writing to a screen or outputs in IO automata They can
not in themselves yield any information about high level user activity yet their
occurrence can be deduced from the low level events
For example a high level output might precede low level activity
P  h   l   Stop
If h cannot be refused by the high level then the occurrence of l gives no infor
mation Yet the above characterisation fails hli is possible for P n fhg but not
for P
k
fhg
Stop

In this case some restrictions must be introduced to the kind of high level
user U
 
and U

that should be indistinguishable by low level may testing In
particular that they should always be able to perform any high level output
event HO where H  HI  HO In the traces model this is captured by
requiring any trace to be extendible by any event in HO  We require that any
high level user U is open on HO 
In the presence of signals P is may noninterfering or mayNI if for any test
T  and any two high level users U
 
and U

open on HO 
U
 
k
H
P n H may T 	 U

k
H
P n H may T
The original characterisation of may noninterfering is a special case of this for
which HO   	
Theorem  P is mayNI if and only if
Stop
k
HI
P n HO  P n H
 
Proof If P is mayNI then the two HO open high level users Run
HO
and Run
H
have that
Run
HO
k
H
P n H may T 	 Run
H
k
H
P n H may T
for any T  and so
Stop
k
HI
P n HO  P n H
This means that if tr is a trace of P  then there is a trace of P with the
same low level presentation no high level inputs and possibly dierent high level
outputs if tr  tracesP then tr n H  tracesP n H  and so tr n H 
tracesStop
k
HI
P n HO and so tr n H  tracesP n HO
Conversely assume P
k
HI
Stop n HO  P n H  Any HO open user U must
have all traces of Run
HO
as possible traces Thus
Run
H
v tracesU  v Run
HO
and so by monotonicity
P n H  Run
H
k
H
P n H
v U
k
H
P n H
v Run
HO
k
H
P n H  P
k
HI
Stop n HO
Composability 
and thus
U
 
k
H
P n H  U

k
H
P n H
for any two HO open users U
 
and U

so they may pass exactly the same tests
 
The low level interface L could also be divided into LI and LO  with tests
restricted to those that can always accept events from LO  but this in fact makes
no dierencethis more restricted set of tests is as discriminating since any test
T that distinguishes two high level users can be transformed into a LO open test
T jjj Run
LO
that also distinguishes them since the component Run
LO
does not
introduce any more success states
 Composability
The characterisation of mayNI allows us to examine which CSP composition
operators preserve it In the literature systems are generally composed so as
to preserve the classi
cation level of events see eg  	 In this paper we
consider such compositions but also go further and also consider compositions
in which parts of one process high level interface are connected to parts of an
others low level interface Thus each process P will be associated with its own
classi
cation of events from its interface into high level events H
P
 HI
P
HO
P

and low level events L
P

  Interleaving
Two processes are interleaved if they run side by side without any direct in
teraction This situation is pictured in Figure  The sets H
P
and H
Q
can
overlap as can L
P
and L
Q
 However high and low level sets cannot overlap
H
P
 H
Q
  L
P
 L
Q
   
Theorem  If P and Q are mayNI then so too is P jjj Q   
Proof In the case where there are no high level signals the proof is very straight
forward we show that P jjj Q n H  P jjj Q
k
H
Stop
Let H  H
P
 H
Q

P jjj Q n H  P n H  jjj Q n H 
 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
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P
k
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Figure  P and Q side by side
In the more general case with high level signals we require for the last step
of the proof that no event is a high level input for one process and a high level
output for the other HI
P
 HO
Q
   and HI
Q
 HO
P
   In this case
P jjj Q n H
P
 H
Q
 P n H
P
 jjj Q n H
Q

 P
k
HI
P
Stop n HO
P
jjj Q
k
HI
Q
Stop n HO
Q
 P jjj Q
k
HI
P
 HI
Q
Stop n HO
P
 HO
Q
Hence P jjj Q is mayNI The last line uses the fact that P
k
HI
P
Stop  P
k
HI
P
 HI
Q
Stop and similarly for Q   
 Chaining
In this composition the low level interface of one process is connected to the high
level interface of the other Their resulting common interface is then hidden The
situation is pictured in Figure  The sets H  M  and L are pairwise disjoint P
has alphabet H M with H as high level events and M as low level and Q has
alphabet M  L with M as its high level events and L as low level
In this situation it is in fact sucient for either one of these processes to be
mayNI for their combination to be mayNI
Theorem  If either P or Q is mayNI then so too is P 
 Q   
Composability 
Proof We are concerned with the mayNI properties of P
k
M
Q n M  which
has H as its high level events as in Figure 
P
k
M
Q n M n H  P n H 
k
M
Q n M
 P
k
H
Stop
k
M
Q n M
 P
k
M
Q nM 
k
H
Stop
The step
P n H 
k
M
Q n M  P
k
H
Stop
k
M
Q nM
is justi
ed in one of two ways depending on whether it is P or Q that is mayNI
 If it is P  then P n H   P
k
H
Stop and the result follows
 If it is Q  then U
k
M
Q n M  U

k
M
Q n M for any U and U

by
Corollary  and the step provides a particular instantiation
In the presence of signals if P is mayNI then so too is P 
 Q 
P
k
M
Q n M n H  P n H 
k
M
Q n M
 P
k
HI
Stop n HO
k
M
Q nM
 P
k
M
Q n M
k
HI
Stop n HO
Furthermore if Q is mayNI and P is open on HO  then P 
 Q is mayNI
where Q s high level interface M is divided into events MI and signals MO
P
k
M
Q n M n H  P n H 
k
M
Q n M
 P
k
H
Stop
k
M
Q n M since Q is mayNI
 P
k
M
Q n M
k
H
Stop
since if P is open on HO then so too is P n H and P
k
H
Stop
However if P is not open on MO then P 
 Q need not be mayNI even if
Q is For example
P  h   mo   Stop
Q  mo   l   Stop

H M L
P
Q
Figure  P and Q in a chain
The fact that P can block mo until after h occurs allows information to  ow from
high to low In this case P 
 Q  h   l   Stop
Of course if P is also mayNI then we have previously shown that P 
 Q
must be so any counterexample must make use of some P which is not mayNI
 
 Synchronisation
In the general case P and Q can synchronise on both high level and low level
events Let H  H
P
 H
Q
and L  L
P
 L
Q
with H  L    Let I  H  L
be any synchronisation set between P and Q  Then P in parallel with Q on this
set will be mayNI whenever P and Q both are
Theorem  If P and Q are mayNI then so too is P
k
I
Q   
Proof
P
k
I
Q n H w P n H 
k
I
Q n H 
 P
k
H
Stop
k
I
Q
k
H
Stop
 P
k
I
Q
k
H
Stop
But P
k
I
Q n H v P
k
I
Q
k
H
Stop so they must be equal  
This composition covers a variety of cases In general P and Q may synchro
nise on some events and interleave on others They may have events in common
on which they do not synchronise interleaving above is a special case where
I   
When the component processes allow output signals the composition pre
serves mayNI provided none of the signals are involved in any synchronisation
In this case H  I must be a subset of HI  HI
P
 HI
Q
 and we obtain the
following theorem in which HO  HO
P
 HO
Q

Composability 
H
P
n I
H
Q
n I
H  I
L
P
n I
L
Q
n I
L  I
P
Q
Figure  Some synchronisation between P and Q
Theorem  If P and Q are mayNI and I  HO
P
 HO
Q
    then P
k
I
Q
is mayNI  
Proof We compare P
k
I
Q n H and P
k
I
Q
k
HI
Stop n HO and show that
each is a re
nement of the other
P
k
I
Q
k
HI
Stop n HO
 P
k
HI
Stop
k
I
Q
k
HI
Stop n HO
 P
k
HI
Stop n HO
k
I
Q
k
HI
Stop n HO since I  HO   
 P n H 
k
I
Q n H 
v P
k
I
Q n H
but we also have that
P
k
I
Q n H v P
k
I
Q
k
HI
Stop n HO
and hence the two sides are equal and P
k
I
Q is mayNI  
However the result does not hold when the system allows synchronisation on
high level signals
Example  For example if ho is a high level output signal then both P and
Q exhibit mayNI
P  ho   l   Stop
Q  hi   ho   Stop

P P
Q Q
H
P
L
P
H
P
n I
H
P
 I
L
P
n I
L
P
 I
Figure  Restricting P on high and low interfaces
When these two processes are required to synchronise on fhog then the resulting
process behaves as hi   ho   l   Stop which can perform l only after the
occurrence of the high level input hi  allowing information to  ow from high to
low  
 Restricted synchronisation
Two special cases of synchronisation are when one process Q restricts the be
haviour of a noninterfering process P on just one of its interfaces These two
special cases are pictured in Figure 
Restriction of the high level behaviour of P is an example of synchronisation
in which Q  I  H
P
 It immediately follows that Q is mayNI whatever
its de
nition since it can perform only high level events Hence P
k
I
Q will be
mayNI whenever P is Introducing restrictions to the high level behaviour of P
preserves noninterference
However the result for this special case does not hold in general in the presence
of signals unless there is no synchronisation on output signals as in the case for
synchronisation composition given above The processes given in Example 
provide a counterexample here as well
Similarly introducing restrictions to the low level behaviour of P also pre
serves noninterference If Q  I  L
P
 then Q again is always mayNI since
it can perform only low level events This is also true in the presence of high
level signals since in this case Q is only concerned with low level events and so
there can be no synchronisation on high level signals Hence the result above is
applicable here
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 Hiding
The hiding operator abstracts some of the channels in a process interface In
general these can be both high and low level This abstraction will always
preserve mayNI by restricting the interface through which high level users can
interact with P  and by restricting the interface through which low level tests
can be carried out This is pictured in Figure  where a set A of high and low
level events is hidden
Theorem 	 If P is mayNI then so too is P n A  
Proof The proof is straightforward If P is mayNI then
P n A n H  P n H  n A
 P
k
H
Stop n A
w P n A
k
H
Stop
But also P n A n H v P n A
k
H
Stop and so the two are equal
If P allows high level signals then the result still holds and the proof is as
follows
P n A
k
HI
Stop n HO v Stop
k
HI
P n A n HO
 Stop
k
HI
P n HO n A
 P n H  n A
 P n A n H
But P n A n H v Stop
k
HI
P n A n HO and so the two are equal  

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P
Q
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Figure 
 P and Q in a highlow connection
 Highlow connection
If some of the low level outputs of P are provided as some high level inputs
to Q  then mayNI is not preserved in general The situation is pictured in
Figure  Highlow connection allows some low level output from P as input
into Q with such channels hidden but with some other low outputs from P
remaining available to the low level unlike chaining a special case which we have
already seen does preserve mayNI
Example 
 The following processes provide an example of a pair of mayNI
processes whose composition is not mayNI
P  m   l   Stop
Q  h   m   Stop
P clearly provides mayNI since it has only low level inputs Q also provides
mayNI since it has only high level events
However P
k
M
Q n M  h   l   Stop
In the highlow connected system the low level occurrence of l provides con

rmation that the high level h occurred Thus the test l   Success is able to
distinguish h   Stop which may pass from Stop which cannot
Observe that P
k
M
Q is not mayNI eitherthe visibility of M makes no
dierence either as a high level set a low level set or spread across the two
levels of the resulting process   
Although highlow connection in the general case does not preserve mayNI this
is not altogether surprising since it allows in some sense a downgrading of infor
mation from high to low
	 Limited highlow connection  
If P does not have any low level interface apart from that with Q  as pictured
in Figure  then if Q is mayNI then so too is the combination of P and Q  P
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restricts a part of Q s high level interface as in restricted synchronisation above
and also has some independent high level activity
Theorem  If H
P
and H
Q
are disjoint P has alphabet H
P
M where H
P
is
high level and Q has alphabet H
Q
M  L
Q
where H
Q
M is the high level
then if Q is mayNI then so is P
k
M
Q n M  P can be any process and does
not even have to be mayNI itself  
Proof We are considering the system P
k
M
Q nM 
P
k
M
Q n M
k
H
P
 H
Q
Stop
 P
k
H
P
 H
Q
Stop
k
M
Q
k
H
P
 H
Q
Stop n M
 P
k
H
P
Stop
k
M
Q
k
H
Q
Stop n M
 P
k
H
P
Stop
k
M H
Q
Q n M
 P
k
H
P
Stop
k
M H
Q
Q n M  H
Q
 P n H
P

k
M H
Q
Q n M  H
Q
 P n H
P
 jjj Run
H
Q

k
M H
Q
Q nM  H
Q
since Q is mayNI
 P n H
P

k
M
Q n M  H
Q
 P
k
M
Q n M  n H
P
 H
Q
The result also holds when P and Q allows signal events provided they do
not synchronise on any This means that M contains no signal events In this
case H
P
can be partitioned into HI
P
and HO
P
 and H
Q
is partitioned into HI
Q

H
P
M
L
P
L
Q
P
Q
Figure  Q connected to P s low level interface
and HO
Q
 We will use the characterisation for mayNI for Q in this case that
U
 
k
M HI
Q
Q n M H
Q
 U

k
M HI
Q
Q nM H
Q
for any processes U
 
and U


P
k
M
Q n M 
k
HI
P
 HI
Q
Stop n HO
P
 HO
Q
 P
k
HI
P
Stop
k
M
Q
k
HI
Q
Stop n M  n HO
P
 HO
Q
 P
k
HI
P
Stop
k
M HI
Q
Q nM  HI
Q
 HO
Q
 HO
P
 P n HI
P
jjj Run
HI
Q

k
M HI
Q
Q n M  HI
Q
 HO
Q
 HO
P
 P n HI
P

k
M
Q n M  HI
Q
 HO
Q
 HO
P
 P
k
M
Q n M  n HI
P
 HI
Q
 HO
P
 HO
Q
This completes the proof for this case  

 Limited highlow connection 
If all of the input to Q is provided as output from P  as pictured in Figure 
then mayNI of the result follows purely from that of P  In fact Q can be any
process and need not itself provide noninterference This setup is much easier
to verify than the previous one
Theorem  If P is mayNI and has alphabet H
P
M  L
P
where H
P
is high
level and Q has alphabet M L
Q
where M is high level then combining P and
Q on M does preserve mayNI M does not have to be hidden Q can be any
process and does not even have to be mayNI itself  
Proof We are concerned with P
k
M
Q
P
k
M
Q n H
P
 P n H
P

k
M
Q
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 P
k
H
P
Stop
k
M
Q
 P
k
M
Q
k
H
P
Stop
In the case where there are high level signals H
P
 HI
P
HO
P
 and we have
P
k
M
Q n HI
P
 HO
P
 P n HI
P
 HO
P

k
M
Q
 P
k
HI
P
Stop n HO
P

k
M
Q
 P
k
M
Q
k
HI
P
Stop n HO
P
 
In fact P and Q can even synchronise on some of their low level events and
the result will still hold
 External composition
The three composition constructs most frequently considered in the literature
with regard to composability of noninterference properties are crossproduct
cascade and feedback The descriptions of 	 will be considered here In that
context high and low events are split into inputs and outputs These can be
considered in terms of the compositions that have been discussed already
  Crossproduct
The cross product of two systems simply considers one as high level and the
other as low level with no communication between them It can be pictured as
in Figure 
In this situation P has alphabet H and Q has alphabet L They are there
fore both mayNI from H to L Their combination may be considered as an
interleaving P jjj Q  yielding mayNI Alternatively they may be considered as a
chain P
k
M
Q n M  where neither of them ever performs events on the common
channel M  or where M is empty This also yields mayNI

HI
HO
LI
LO
P
Q
Figure  Cascade of P and Q
  Cascade
A cascade allows both high and low level communication between P and Q  as
pictured in Figure 
In CSP terms there will be some intersection H
I
 H
P
H
Q
between the high
level interfaces H
P
and H
Q
of P and Q  and also L
I
 L
P
 L
Q
between their
low level interfaces L
P
and L
Q
 A cascade will then be a parallel combination of
P and Q  with their common interfaces treated as internal channels
P
k
H
I
 L
I
Q n H
I
 L
I

Since parallel combination synchronisation preserves mayNI  and so does hid
ing it follows that cascade also preserves mayNI
  Feedback
Feedback is the most complicated of the three composition operators and in
general its de
nition varies depending on the framework being used for analysis
and can be quite complicated In 	 some of the output of P is supplied as
input to Q  and similarly the output from Q is provided as input to P  P also
accepts input from and provides output to its environment Messages may be
transformed when passing between P and Q  We will use processes R
H
and R
L
to
describe such transformations Events are categorised as high or low the same
way by both processes so there is no connection from one process high events
to anothers low events
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In the CSP framework one way of describing this form of feedback is as follows
P jjj Q
k
H
R
H

k
L
R
L
 n I
for suitable R
H
and R
L
which describe the transformations on the messages pass
ing between P and Q  This is pictured in Figure  Since this is composed
entirely using operations which preserve mayNI provided there are no signals
it follows that the resulting system is mayNI Indeed even if the processes R
H
and R
L
were absent and the processes P and Q connected up directly this is
still true
In this description a feedback composition in CSP is not much more compli
cated than a cascade it is simply a parallel combination of two systems with some
additional process behaviour at the high and the low level with some channels
hidden It follows that it preserves mayNI
Synchronous IO semantic frameworks describe a form of pure feedback which
connects an output of a process directly to one of its own inputs This form of
feedback in which an output synchronises with an input of the same process
cannot be modelled directly in CSP since each event in a process execution is
independent However a buered feedback loop is easy to describe Figure 
pictures a high level output ho being fed into a high level input hi  This is an
example of restricted synchronisation discussed above as long as ho is not a
signal the result will be exhibit mayNI whenever P does

B
u

e
r
L
H
hi
ho
P
Figure  CSP view of Buered Feedback on P
 Discussion
This paper has formulated a noninterference property may noninterference and
has shown that it is compositional in the sense that it is preserved by a wide
range of CSP composition operators including interleaving synchronising paral
lel under certain conditions restriction hiding chaining and forms of highlow
connection As a result it is also preserved by the external operators typically
considered in studies of noninterference cross product cascade and forms of
feedback These results hold both when all events are considered as synchroni
sations and when high level outputs are considered as signals that cannot be
refused
The use of a process algebraic approach was originally motivated by the fact
that concurrency theory provides a mature framework for de
ning and analysing
properties and for reasoning about combinations of components This has re
sulted in a wide range of results and in simple proofs
  Semantic frameworks
There have been a large number of approaches to noninterference To some
extent compositionality results must depend on the semantic framework used to
model systems and its composition operators as well as the characterisation of
the noninterference properties within that framework For example Wittbold
and Johnson 	 and McLean 	 consider processes as sets of traces in which
all system inputs and outputs occur in each step Systems to be composed thus
proceed in synchronous lockstep On the other hand Goguen and Meseguer 	
McCullough 	 and OHalloran 	 consider sets of traces in which high and low
level inputs and outputs occur independently of each other as we do in this paper
Zakinthinos and Lee 	 also consider such traces but require that processes are
open on all of their inputs NonInterference properties in these frameworks
generally take the form that if the system has an execution with a particular low
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level projection then there must be other executions with dierent high level
activity and with the same low level projection For example noninference 	
requires that if an execution has a particular low level projection then there must
be some other execution with that same projection but no high level activity at
all Forward correctability described in 	 requires that it must be possible to
alter any high level input value and obtain another trace exactly the same except
possibly for the values of subsequent high level outputs Separability 	 requires
that for any low level projection of any execution and any high level projection
of any execution there must be some execution which combines exactly those two
views These de
nitions and others are motivated by the philosophy that the
low level view of an execution should not give away certain information about
what has occurred at the high level Composition results for these properties
are obtained in the state machine or event system frameworks in which they are
de
ned and analysed but the de
nitions of system composition in these dierent
semantic frameworks will be dierent to each other and it is not clear how to
compare them or how to apply results from one approach to another
 Process algebras
There are also a number of approaches which make use of process algebraic tech
niques based on CSP   	 CCS 	 or the asynchronous calculus 	
These are often concerned with issues such as nondeterminism and generally
use failures information traces together with possible refusals or bisimulation
information whether processes can match executions by passing through match
ing states to characterise noninterference properties Thus if some high level
activity can possibly lead to dierent low level oers being made then such char
acterisations will identify this even if the low level trace does not provide that
information
For example the process
P  l   h   Stop   h   Stop u l   Stop
can perform l and h in either order but if h occurs 
rst then there is a non
deterministic possibility that l will not be oered the refusal of l will provide
information that h has occurred However each of its low level traces hi and
hli is compatible with each of its high level traces hi and hhi Some information
other than traces is required to identify the possibility of information  ow via the
refusal
Ryan proposed a generalisation of the Goguen and Meseguer unwinding char
acterisation of noninterference 	 by stipulating that the set of refusal events
and the set of possible next events for any state of the process do not change on
occurrence of a high level event This property is violated by P  since initially it
cannot refuse l  but it can refuse l after occurrence of the 
rst h

More recently Roscoe Woodcock and Wulf 	 proposed that a process
exhibits noninterference if its low level behaviour is deterministic whenever its
high level behaviour is abstracted This means that whatever high level behaviour
occurs the low level view will be unaected This property also incorporates
refusal information since this is required to identify nondeterminism The process
P above does not meet this property since when h is abstracted the resulting low
level process can both perform and refuse to perform l  This de
nition is very
strong and is preserved by re
nement unlike the majority of noninterference
properties but it rules out many processes which contain some nondeterminism
even if there is no information  ow
To allow nondeterminism and motivated by the desire to 
nd a property
preserved by re
nement Lowe 	 recently proposed a de
nition which essentially
requires that any resolution of nondeterminism in the process yields a process that
meets Ryans unwinding conditions P fails to meet this property as well
In the context of CCS Focardi and Gorrieri 	 propose that a system Q does
not allow information  ow if Q prevented from performing H is equivalent to
Q with all occurrences of H hidden a low level user should not be able to tell
whether events in H have occurred or not By varying the notion of equivalence
to cover a variety of failure and bisimulation equivalences this gives rise to a
variety of forms of noninterference Our characterisation of mayNI is the same
as their notion instantiated with trace equivalence or may testing equivalence
The process P above does not meet their de
nition when failures equivalence is
used the possibility of l s refusal after the occurrence of h is identi
ed By using
bisimulation equivalence yet more subtle properties can also be identi
ed
For example the process
P

 l
 
  l

  Stop   l
 
  l

  Stop
  h   l
 
  l

  Stop u l

  Stop
is able to perform l
 
at the low level followed nondeterministically by either l

or
l

 This is consistent with h either present or absent at the high level However if
h is performed then the nondeterministic choice between l

and l

is not resolved
until after l
 
 whereas if h is not performed then it is resolved on the occurrence
of l
 
 This is the kind of distinction that bisimulation equivalence picks up and
so by using weak bisimulation as the equivalence for noninterference we 
nd
that P

allows interference since h can interfere with the point at which a choice
is resolved If this kind of information is available as low level information then
there will have been some information  ow
Even in cases where this equivalence is stronger than required bisimulation
equivalence is often ecient to check and in cases where it does hold it will imply
the weaker property that is required
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 Testing
Testing equivalences are also considered by Focardi and Gorrieri though they
use such equivalences directly in their de
nition that P blocked on H should be
testing equivalent to P with H hidden This is the characterisation arrived at in
this paper but it was obtained from a simpler starting point in a de
nition of
noninterference This paper thus provides additional insight into their de
nition
A formulation similar to the starting point taken in this paper is proposed
by Hennessy and Riely 	 in the context of the more expressive asynchronous 
calculus They formulate conditions using types on P and Q which guarantee a
noninterference property that if P and Q are equivalent under may testing at a
particular security level then P j H and Q j K are equivalent under may testing
for arbitrary top level processes H and K  Our formulation uses a single process
in place of P and Q  requiring that P j H and P j K are indistinguishable
but this is a minor dierence The greater expressiveness of the calculus over
CSP allows dynamic process creation and network recon
guration which may
provide more opportunities for information to  ow from high to low Questions
as to which systems exhibit noninterference are thus dierent to those for CSP
However the formulation of noninterference in terms of the impact of the system
in conjunction with a high level user or process on its low level environment is
strikingly similar to that presented in this paper
 Must testing
The process P described above allows information about occurrence of the high
level event h to be deduced from a low level refusal of l  The may testing charac
terisation of noninterference presented in this paper is not 
ne enough to capture
this and in fact the process P is mayNI However it is easy to imagine a sce
nario in which the event l is blocked during an execution and that this is observed
at the low level It would seem that a formulation of noninterference which is
sensitive to refusal information would be of bene
t
The form of testing which corresponds to failuresdivergences equivalence in
CSP is must testing This states that P must pass a test T if all maximal
executions of P
k

T  n  reach a success state of T  Then P and Q are
equivalent under must testing if they must pass exactly the same tests T 
This form of testing seems to oer some opportunity for making the kind of
distinctions we wish to make It would be natural to state that P is mustNI if
U
 
k
H
P is must equivalent to U

k
H
P for any two high level processes U
 
and
U

 For example the test T  l   Success is able to distinguish Stop
k
h
P
from h   Stop
k
h
P through must testing the 
rst process must pass T  but
the second might not since the l might be prevented from occurring However


mustNI does not exhibit such pleasant properties as mayNI
Firstly it turns out that mustNI and strong mustNI in which high level
users can observe though not prevent low level events directly are distinct For
example the system
P  l
 
   Stop u l

  Stop   h
 
  l

  Stop
  h
 
  l
 
  Stop u l

  Stop
is mustNI because at the low level it is always guaranteed to initially oer l
 

and then either refuse l

or oer it If a high level process in the setup of Figure 
can initially refuse h
 
then this will not be aected by the occurrence of l
 
 and so
both alternatives must be possible If it can initially perform h
 
then this might
occur before l
 
and hence again lead to the two possibilities
On the other hand P is not strongNI The high level process l
 
  h
 
 
l

  Stop   l

  Stop in the setup of Figure  is able to make h
 
available
precisely after l
 
has occurred so that l

cannot be refused after l
 
 On the other
hand a high level process Stop is not able to do this Thus the low level test
l
 
  l

  Success will distinguish between these two possibilities
Conversely if a process is strong mustNI then it is mustNI To see this
consider a strong mustNI process P  where U
 
k
H
P mustT  and consider another
high level user U

 We have that Run
L
jjj U
 

k
H L
P must T  since it has
exactly the same executions as U
 
k
H
P Since P is strong mustNI is follows
that Run
L
jjj U


k
H L
P must T as well since T cannot distinguish between two
high level processes But then U

k
H
P must T  Since this is true for arbitrary
U

 it follows that P is mustNI
With regard to compositionality mustNI is not preserved by many of the
CSP operators not even by interleaving and hence not by general parallel com
position For example we have seen that process P above is mustNI So too
is
Q  l

  h

  Stop
However P jjj Q is not mustNI A high level process h

  h
 
  Stop can
provide some information concerning the occurrence of h
 

Consider the low level behaviour hl
 
 l

i fl

g of P jjj Q  in which the trace
l
 
and l

is followed by the refusal of l

 This behaviour is possible if the high
level process is Stop but not if it is h

  h
 
  Stop since the occurrence of l

after l
 
ensures that h
 
can only occur after l
 
 and hence ensures that l

cannot
be refused after hl
 
 l

i Thus the test l
 
  l

  l

  Success allows those two
high level processes to be distinguished under must testing
The situation is fractionally better with regard to strong mustNI This coun
terexample does not hold because P is not strong mustNI It is currently an
open question as to whether or not strong mustNI is preserved by interleaving
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Although both forms of mustNI are initially plausible de
nitions it is not
clear what they correspond to in an intuitive sense Furthermore the rather
bizarre examples given above seem to indicate that they are not straightforward
When a system is examined for information  ow we are generally concerned with
what might leak during a single execution We do not generally assume that the
low level agent has the opportunity to interact with the system from the same
state as many times as is necessary to exercise all of its possibilities Yet this
is the situation encapsulated by must testing For the kind of property we are
concerned with it would be more appropriate to include some notion of refusal
test  	 so that the refusal information obtained during a single execution
can be accounted for in a semantic model that deals with this directly Timed
models for CSP provide such models and their application here are the subject
of current research
All of these approaches thus far have provided forms of noninterference which
do not permit deductions from low level observations that high level events have
occurred However they do permit deductions that certain high level events or
traces have not occurred and it has been argued see eg 	 that this is also a
form of information  ow For example it can be useful to a low level attacker to
know that an alarm has not been switched on Initial investigations have shown
that including Success in the high level processes under appropriate conditions
will lead to testing formulations which address issues concerning the absence of
high level activity This is the subject of current research
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